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Appellees the State of Idaho and the Idaho Department of Fish & Game 
( collectively "Fish & Game") provide a lot more smoke than fire in their opposition 
brief. There is little actual mystery as to what happened: Fish & Game put an 
unqualified employee on a flight, and her negligent failure to maintain control of her 
personal items caused the deaths of three people. Neither of these points is in any 
serious dispute - moreover, to overcome summary judgment, Ki:initt did not have to 
show that this is the only possible interpretation of the evidence, but only that a 
reasonable juror might conclude that this is what happened. 
To avoid these simple truths, Fish & Game offers mostly obfuscation and 
misdirection, hiding from the facts and its own expert's conclusions. 
1. It is Fish & Game, not Krinitt, that has made an Evolving Presentation 
Fish & Game claims tl1at Krinitt keeps changing theories, as it disproves them 
one after another. Resp. Br. 2-3. As even a cursory review of the record shows, this 
is completely false. Krinitt served the Stimpson Report on December 2, 2013. R., 
Vol. II, p. 263, 265. He served the Grandy Report - in response to Fish & Game's 
expert Sommer- on January 17, 2014.1 R., Vol. II, p. 386. Fish & Game filed its 
1 The report was submitted to the district court but inadvertently omitted from the record on appeal. 
Krinitt has filed an Unopposed Motion to augment the record to include it. Fish & Game seems 
1 
motion for summary judgment on January 31, 2014, almost two months after the 
Stimpson report was submitted. Stimpson was deposed in March 2014 - Fish & 
Game's counsel did not have time to do so in December, when the schedule provided 
for expert depositions. In his deposition, Stimpson explained, and did not contradict 
his report. I<:rinitt's opposition brief, filed in April 2014, was based substantially on 
his experts' conclusions, and, at oral argument, counsel reiterated them. So far as 
Krinitt is concerned, there should be, and is, no contradiction ( or, indeed, daylight) 
between the opinions given in the December 2013 Stimpson report and any 
presentation he has made to either the district court or this Court. 
In contrast, Fish & Game presented more of a moving target in the district 
court. Its motion for summary judgment was quite limited. In its brief here, Fish & 
Game says the motion was based on his contention that K.rinitt "had not produced 
any evidence that Schiff became airsick, that she opened the door of the helicopter, or 
that she had control of the clipboard prior to it exiting the helicopter."2 Resp. Br. at 
not to have received the report at the time it was originally served. It was not rewritten after service, 
however. 
2 This is a gross misstatement of the state of Fish & Game's knowledge at the time of the motion, 
for two reasons. First, Fish & Game was complaining that K.rinitt had not "produced" particular 
evidence when in fact it had never sent him any discovery requests. More importantly, as noted 
above, Krinitt's opening expert report had been served on Fish & Game nearly two months earlier, 
and that report included opinions based on evidence concerning each of these issues raised by Fish 
2 
2. As is clear from this characterization of Fish & Game's motion, no other issues 
(e.g., duty, proximate cause) were raised in the motion, thus properly before the 
district court. This has not stopped Fish & Game from raising other issues -- in 
reply, in oral argument, here - as the original basis for summary judgment was shown 
to be untenable. 
Ordinarily, this sort of lawyers' squabble would not merit discussion in a brief 
before this Court. Here, though, it has had two impacts. First, it affects the record, 
because Krinitt responded in the district court to the issues that were raised in the 
motion, and not those that were not raised, and second because the district court was 
apparently inspired to consider in its own broadening of the scope of the motion, and 
engaged in the various fact free speculations discussed in Krinitt's opening brief. See, 
e.g., App. Br. at 22-25. Fish & Game does not even try to defend the district court on 
these points. 
& Game. The contention, made by implication in the district court and explicitly here, that the 
Stimpson report was ginned up in response to Fish & Game's motion for summary judgment is 
provably incorrect. 
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2. If, as Fish & Game Contends, the District Court Ruled Krinitt's Expert 
Reports Admissible, it was Obligated to Deny Summary Judgment 
Fish & Game asserts that the district court denied its motion to strike Krinitt's 
expert reports, sub silentio. Resp. Br. 27.3 If so, then its grant of summary judgment 
was clearly in error. The expert affidavits, and reports, if admitted, by themselves 
present genuine issues of material fact as to the issues raised in Fish & Game's 
motion. Fish & Game does not argue any different: it does not contend that even if 
the experts are correct in their conclusions, summary judgment should nonetheless be 
granted. Instead, Fish & Game ignored the Stimpson report when it filed its original 
motion, and then moved to strike it when it filed its reply brief in the district court. 
Even now, it argues that it motion to strike should have been granted. Resp. Br. at 
28-29. It does so for good reason: if the contents of the Stimpson report are 
considered admissible evidence, summary judgment cannot be affirmed. 
Two experts with decades of experience around helicopters, and with 
investigating crashes, offered unambiguous opinion testimony that the evidence 
discovered in the various investigations, and in their own investigations, was sufficient 
to reach the conclusions they advance. Fish & Game's expert offered no opinion to 
3 Fish & Game claims that the district court "referred to opinions from these experts in its findings. 
R Vol. II, p 394." Resp. Br. at 27. Krinitt does not understand Fish & Game reading ofthe district 
court's findings. 
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the contrary: he did not present any analysis at all of I<.rinitt's experts' methods or 
conclusions. Instead, Fish & Game offers only rhetoric and repetition. No one 
contests that expert opinions must be based on evidence: as to whether these 
opinions were, nothing in the cases cited by Fish & Game, or its counsel's rhetoric, 
demonstrate that the experts were merely speculating. 
3. Fish & Game's Arguments Contradict the Evidence 
At the outset of the case, Fish & Game hired an expert to conduct an 
investigation and issue a report on how the accident was caused. The expert, an 
engineer with well more than a decade of experience investigating air crashes, spent 
hours examining the wreckage, reviewed the numerous investigation reports, reading 
the depositions, and poring over the documents. He did not come back with 'I'm 
sorry, but there isn't enough evidence to offer an opinion about what happened.' He 
did not come back with 'There's likelihood - a possibility at least - that the pilot had 
control over the clipboard and somehow managed to let it get out of the helicopter.'4 
He did not say 'Plaintiff's expert doesn't have sufficient evidence for the conclusions 
4 Had he done so, Krinitt's rebuttal expert would have responded with an analysis based on the 
evidence. 
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he has reached.'5 However, instead of relying on its own expert's expertise, Fish & 
Game decided to advance its own conclusions, here and in the district court, with 
neither expertise nor factual bases to back them up. 
4. There is No Evidence that the Pilot had Control of the Clipboard 
Fish & Game's principal defense here is the rank speculation that perhaps the 
pilot, rather than the biologist, had control of the clipboard. In support of this 
speculation, it produces no evidence whatsoever. It cannot produce any testimony 
from its own biologists, or helicopter pilots, taking control of clipboards, it cannot 
point to any evidence of pilots taking on a biologist's clipboard, it cannot show 
anywhere in its training that biologists might expect a pilot to take their clipboards. 
Certainly the testimony of the two witnesses on the ground, who only really looked up 
at the helicopter after the clipboard had struck the tail rotor - see R. Supp. 445-49, 
451-54, cited by Resp. Br. at 16, 17 -- do not,support this theory. There is, truly, 
nothing at all behind the speculation that the pilot might have had control of the 
clipboard. 
5 Fish & Games expert report was served two weeks later than Krinitt's first expert report. 
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Of course, any theory of where the clipboard was must also account for how it 
got out the door. If, for example - and there is no evidence for this whatsoever - the 
pilot had been sitting on the clipboard, it could not have gotten out the door. This is 
because the biologist was blocking the door. On the other hand, if the biologist had 
the clipboard in her lap, or at her right side, it could have slipped out when the door 
was open. None of the experts concluded that the pilot had the clipboard, however: 
there is no evidence for such a conclusion, it would not make sense, and it cannot be 
squared with the evidence that does exist, which is that the clipboard exited the right 
side door. And because there is no evidence that the pilot had control over the 
clipboard - much less sufficient evidence every reasonable juror must conclude that 
the pilot had the clipboard, the district court's rejection of Krinitt's res ipsa theory was 
error.6 
5. There is Considerable Evidence that a Fish & Game Biologist was 
Supposed to Maintain Control of the Clipboard 
No living witness saw the clipboard in the moments before the accident. This 
does not mean that there is no way to know who was responsible for it. The evidence 
is undisputed that one of the biologists had the clipboard when they were getting 
6 Obviously, res ipsa does not change the burden of proof at trial. C.C. Anderson Stores Co. v. Boise 
Water Co., 84 Idaho 355, 360 (1962), quoted by Fish & Game, holds as much. This case has nothing 
to do with this summary judgment standard, however. 
7 
ready to get in the helicopter. It was a Fish & Game clipboard brought along on the 
mission so that the junior biologist - the last person observed with the clipboard -
could use it on the mission. There was no reason for her to have given the clipboard 
to anyone else on the flight: nothing in the flight briefing suggesting that someone else 
would handle the clipboard, see R., Vol. I, p. 138-139, and indeed, there is no room to 
put the clipboard either with the pilot or "behind" the seat.7 
It is not true that the biologists had no flight responsibility. As the district 
court concluded, they had one principal flight-related duty: to secure their personal 
belongings. They were told repeatedly to do so, it was part of the training in the pre-
flight briefing, and the reliance on them doing so formed the basis for the owner of 
the helicopter's lack of fear of clipboards.8 
6. Fish & Game's Safety Regulations are not Mere "Guidelines" 
Fish & Game's arguments concerning its flight safety training regulations 
(Resp. Br. at 25-26) are not just cynical, they are dangerous. The drafters of the 
7 There is no evidence that there was any storage in the helicopter large enough for a clipboard. 
Certainly there is no "between" seats on a bench seat. 
8 In his opening brief, Krinitt explained that the district court misinterpreted Mr. Pope's testimony 
by failing to take account of his later clarification. App. Br. 24 and n.8. Fish & Game does not 
engage this point at all, instead merely repeating the unclarified testimony without reference to the 
clarification. Resp. Br. at 17 
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regulations, and the Director who adopted them, could not have been clearer about 
their mandatory nature. The text of both the memorandum adopting the regulation 
and the regulation itself includes mandatory phrases like as set forth in the margin9• 
Until it was briefing this case, the mandatory nature of the regulations was certainly 
clear within Fish & Game. See R., Vol. I, p. 112-13, 133. Fish & Game points to no 
evidence that, outside of the context of this lawsuit, it has ever considered these 
regulations to be advisory rather than mandatory: it offers no textual analysis, no 
internal policy memoranda, and no set of agency customs or practices. 
Nor do the facts of this case show that Fish & Game does not, outside of this 
lawsuit, consider the regulations binding. The biologist was not flight qualified, and 
went to the regional flight safety officer to find out what to do. Rather than schedule 
the in person flight training required by the regulation, or, indeed, even read the 
regulation, the regional flight safety officer gave the biologist a shortcut. He then 
9 See R., Vol. II at 311 (among "required" actions pre-flight, the responsible individual must "select 
observers" who "[h]ave completed low altitude flight safety training."); Id. at 322. ("[c]lose 
adherence to this policy will assure optimum safety for both employees and aircraft operators and 
minimize potential liability claims against [Fish & Game]"); Id. at 326. ("Employees who will be 
flying ... for any Department work are required to take the in-person flight safety training ... every 3ru 
year ... [and] must let their regional flight safety supervisor and/ or supervisor that they have 
completed the training"); Id. ("each employee "must" read the regulation and certify that they have 
read it and understand it, and "must" forward certification to their supervisor and regional flight 
safety officer''); Id. at 339. ("no employee will [be] authorized to fly until [certification] is signed and 
the possession of his/her supervisor."). 
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went on vacation and did nothing to ensure that she complied (and she did not 
comply even with the shortcut). Whether or not this negligence supports I<:rinitt's 
claims - and it does as is discussed below - it is clear that Fish & Game failed its 
biologists. For the sake of those biologists, and its other employees that will be flying 
in the future, the Court should not absolve Fish & Game of responsibility for this 
failure by declaring the regulations non-binding. 
Fish & Game's reliance on Service Emplqyees Int'! Union Local 6 v. Idaho Dept. of 
Health & We!fare, 106 Idaho 756 (1984), is misplaced. As I<:rinitt has already 
explained, SEIU is not about negligence per se - indeed those words do not occur in 
the opinion. A state employee was trying to argue that he could challenge his 
reorganization-related pay decrease in district court, rather than at the Idaho 
Personnel Commission, contending that violations of certain handbook provisions 
gave rise to a cause of action cognizable in the district court. I<:rinitt is not looking to 
the flight safety rules to create a cause of action here: his cause of action comes from 
the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Rather, he is asserting that Fish & Game's violation of its 
safety rules allows him to lessen (but not eliminate - see Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 
395 (2001)) his burden of proof. SEIU has nothing to do with negligence per se, and 
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the Court's cases about negligence per se do not turn on whether speed limits, 
building codes, driver's licenses statutes and the like create a private right of action. 
Fish & Game's violation of the flight safety rules caused the accident is two 
ways. First, the unqualified biologist should not have been on the flight at all. The 
case is similar, in this sense, to O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49 (2005), a case 
that arose from the death of children playing at an unsupervised landfill. The 
regulation at issue with respect to negligence per se was not about how the pit wall 
that collapsed should have been angled, braced, or otherwise supported. It was about 
steps that were supposed to be taken to prevent unauthorized persons from being 
there at all. Had the regulations been complied with, the children would not have 
been in harm's way. 
The second way in which the violation of the regulation caused the accident is 
that the training that was skipped would have underlined, again, the need to secure 
personal items. Obviously, at trial, Krinitt will have to prove that the biologist's 
failure to secure the clipboard caused the accident to prevail this prong. At this stage, 
however, he need only show sufficient evidence that a reasonable juror could so 
conclude. As discussed above, he has met this burden. 
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7. Fish & Game Misstates the Bases for Stimpson's Conclusion that 
Nausea was a likely Cause of the Accident 
No matter how many times Fish & Game repeats it, Stimpson's conclusion that 
the biologists' nausea was likely the reason for the open door was not based solely on 
the testimony of Mr. Atchison. It is right there in the report: he also relied on 
testimony from Mr. Pope that the biologist had told him that she had had motion 
sickness issues in the past. R., Vol. II, p. 272. In addition, both experts relied on their 
decades of experience flying helicopters, and the limited reasons one might open a 
door under the conditions of this flight. Once the conclusion of Fish & Game's 
expert that the door came open spontaneously is ruled out - as it must be for reasons 
discussed below - the only remaining possibility is that it was opened intentionally, 
most likely by the person sitting next to the door. 
No matter who opened the door or why it was open, the biologist was still 
supposed to secure her personal items. Her failure to do so was the exact cause of 
this fatal accident. R., Vol. II, p. 352. Even if Fish & Game is right that there is 
insufficient evidence of nausea,10 the case still goes forward. 
10 With respect to Fish & Game's destruction of the biologist's flight suit, Krinitt will ask the district 
court to instruct the jury on spoliation. Fish & Game points out that he has not done so yet (Resp. 
Br. at 17 n. 8) - this is correct: neither party has yet filed either its proposed jury instructions or its 
motions in limine, if any. 
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8. This Court cannot Affirm based on the Report from Fish & Game's 
Expert 
Fish & Game has not asked that the Court affirm on the alternative ground 
offered by Fish & Game's expert, and it is well that it did not. The expert, based on 
his examination of the evidence, and his long experience in the field, concluded that 
the helicopter was defective, and that the right side door opened unexpectedly - as it 
had before - and the clipboard, which was in the possession of the biologist sitting on 
the right side, slipped out the open door. This theory cannot form the basis for 
affirming the decision below for two reasons: (1) there are genuine issues of material 
fact with regard to this opinion and its bases and (2) although a defect in the 
helicopter might be a basis for apportioning liability between Fish & Game and the 
helicopter company, it does not entirely eliminate Fish & Game's liability. 
Krinitt's rebuttal expert showed that the door could not have spontaneously 
opened, based principally on two facts: first, that the door cannot spontaneously open 
if a person is sitting in the right side seat (because the person's body blocks the handle 
from coming forward), and second because the door handle had been fixed. Fish & 
Game contends that it is "not known" what was done to fix the handle. Resp. Br. at 
4. Whether this is actually true depends on how one reads Fish & Game's passive 
13 
construction: Fish & Game did not depose the mechanic, but Krinitt's rebuttal expert 
interviewed him, and based his opinion, in part, on that interview. At trial, the jury 
will have an opportunity to weigh the evidence, including from witnesses, and decide 
which expert is most likely right about what happened. This is not a situation, 
though, where this Court can make that determination now. 
Even if the door had come open spontaneously, the biologists were still 
supposed to keep their personal items secure. The one in the right side seat did not 
do so. The jury will have the opportunity, properly instructed, to allocate 
responsibility, if they think the helicopter company has any. This Court is not in a 
position, on this record, to conclude that the accident was solely, or even 
predominantly, the result of a defect in the helicopter. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, and those presented in Krinitt's opening brief, the 
summary judgment should be reversed and the case remanded to the district court for 
trial. 
DATED this the 11th day of March, 2015. 
II 
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